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553 
Schnedler v. Lee: Some (Re)Assembly Required 
What is a parent? The answer depends on who you ask. Some say that 
parental status revolves around biology. Others say that it depends on love 
and support. Some insist that parents are always a pair, while others believe 
one will suffice. In any case, the picture of a parent can look different 
depending on a person’s experiences and can shift and change over time. 
Perhaps the picture eventually expands to include all of the ideas that depict 
what a parent could possibly be. In law, the definition of a parent evolves in 
a similar way.  
However, the law is not really concerned with the societal ideal of what a 
parent is. The law must be able to answer the more difficult questions such 
as: who has the right to physical custody of children, and who should be 
financially responsible for their care? The answers to these questions 
depend on the status of parentage. In Oklahoma, these questions are 
typically answered by the Uniform Parentage Act, which dictates the 
requirements for what it takes to be a legal parent.
1
 For many years, the 
Uniform Parentage Act answered most of the law’s parentage questions.  
 However, a problem arose when same-sex marriage came to the state in 
2014. This development introduced different combinations of figures to the 
picture of who could be a legal parent. The courts did adjust to 
accommodate these new figures, and the decisions still involved the 
traditional number of parents: two. But that did not last long. In 2017, 
Schnedler v. Lee posed a question that had never been asked in Oklahoma 
before: what do we do when the puzzle comes with an extra piece?  
This Note explores the possible answers to that question. Part I details 
what measures the court took in developing the standards regarding same-
sex couple custody issues leading up to Schnedler. Part II describes the case 
itself. Part III is divided into three sections which examine (1) the previous 
case that formed the basis for the outcome of Schnedler, (2) how the court 
applied the standard developed in that case, and (3) whether that standard 
was appropriate in the first place. Finally, Part IV provides suggestions for 
other standards that the court may use to provide a more satisfactory answer 
to our question in the future.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 1. 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 7700-101 to 7800 (2011).  
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I. Putting It Together: Law Before the Case 
Same-sex marriage was officially recognized in Oklahoma
2
 nearly a year 
before the Supreme Court mandated that it be recognized across the nation.
3
 
Since then, Oklahoma courts have been required to restructure parentage 
and custody issues to accommodate the newly-recognized same-sex family 
unit.
4
 Progress was made in fairly short order when Eldredge v. Taylor
5
 
came down from the Oklahoma Supreme Court about four months after the 
ban on same-sex marriage was lifted.  
In Eldredge, Karen Taylor and Julie Eldredge were in a same-sex 
relationship for ten years.
6
 The two entered into a civil union in New 
Zealand and returned to Oklahoma, where they purchased a home together 
and ultimately had two children.
7
 They used an anonymous sperm donor 
and Taylor carried the children, with Eldredge providing full support at 
every stage.
8
 Following the birth of each child, the parties entered into co-
parenting agreements to “guarantee that both parties would be considered 
natural, legal, and acknowledged parents” of their children.
9
 When the 
parties separated Taylor took the children, changed their last names to 
“Taylor,” and eventually prepared to remove them from Oklahoma.
10
  
In her answer to Eldredge’s complaint, Taylor did not contend that 
Eldredge was an unfit parent, but unwittingly relied on the now-defunct 
theory that Oklahoma public policy frowned upon same-sex couples raising 
children and that her status as the biological mother would protect her 
position.
11
 The court ruled that “a person has standing to seek a best-
interest-of-the-child hearing when the sole biological parent relinquishes 
some of her parental rights to the person by entering into a written co-
parenting agreement.”
12
 However, the court also recognized that “[t]he 
                                                                                                                 
 2. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming that the Oklahoma ban 
on same-sex marriages was unconstitutional). 
 3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).  
 4. See generally Robert G. Spector, Same Sex Marriage Came to Oklahoma: Now 
What Happens?, 69 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2016), http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol69/ 
iss1/1. 
 5. 2014 OK 92, 339 P.3d 888.  
 6. Id. ¶ 4, 339 P.3d at 890.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. ¶ 4, 339 P.3d at 891. 
 9. Id. ¶ 5, 339 P.3d at 891. 
 10. Id. ¶ 6, 339 P.3d at 891.  
 11. Id. ¶ 11, 339 P.3d at 892.  
 12. Id. ¶ 1, 339 P.3d at 890. 
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unique and compelling facts of this case make it difficult to create a general 
rule” and limited the ruling to the facts of the case.
13
 This meant that a non-
biological mother in a same-sex parental unit had standing only when 
enforcing a written co-parenting contract.  
Ramey v. Sutton expanded on Eldredge by “acknowledging the rights of 
a non-biological parent in a same-sex relationship who has acted in loco 
parentis” rather than requiring a written agreement.
14
 The facts of Ramey 
were similar to the facts of Eldredge. Charlene Ramey and Kimberly Sutton 
were in a relationship for over eight years during which they decided to 
have a child together, with Sutton carrying the child.
15
 Using a mutual 
friend as a donor, the couple had a baby boy in 2005 and raised the child 
together for several years until they separated.
16
 Ramey then filed an action 
to secure her parental rights.
17
  
The Ramey court chose to continue the tradition of giving “compelling 
consideration to the best interests of the minor child in custody matters.”
18
 
Further, it acknowledged that “when persons assume the status and 
obligations of a parent without formal adoption they stand in loco parentis 
to the child, and, as such, may be awarded custody even against the 
biological parent,” indicating that a biological link was not necessary to 
grant a person parental status.
19
 The court rejected the argument that Ramey 
had no parental rights because the parties chose not to marry even though 
the option was open outside of Oklahoma.
20
 The court established a three-
prong test to establish when a non-biological parent has acted in loco 
parentis: “where the couple, prior to Bishop . . . (1) [was] unable to marry 
legally; (2) engaged in intentional family planning to have a child and to 
co-parent; and (3) the biological parent acquiesced and encouraged the 
same sex partner’s parental role following the birth of the child.”
21
  
When an individual satisfies all prongs of the Ramey test, she acts in loco 
parentis and establishes standing to bring a best-interests-of-the-child 
hearing.
22
 After Ramey, courts began using the test to make standing 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. ¶ 21, 339 P.3d at 895.  
 14. Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d 217, 218. 
 15. Id. ¶ 6, 362 P.3d at 219.  
 16. Id.  
 17. See generally, id.  
 18. Id. ¶ 14, 362 P.3d at 221.  
 19. Id. ¶ 15, 362 P.3d at 221. 
 20. Id. ¶ 13, 362 P.3d at 220.  
 21. Id. ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218. 
 22. Id. ¶ 15, 362 P.3d at 221.  
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determinations in same-sex couple custody disputes.
23
 However, a new 
problem arose when the facts of the case shifted slightly, as they did in 
2017 with Schnedler v. Lee.  
II. New Piece to the Puzzle: Schnedler v. Lee 
A. Mirror Images; The Parties Agree 
Plaintiff Lori Schnedler and Defendant Nicole Lee dated and cohabitated 
before Oklahoma permitted same-sex marriages.
24
 During their relationship, 
the women decided to have a child and raise it together.
25
 Lee’s co-worker, 
third-party Defendant Kevin Platt, agreed to be the sperm donor, and the 
insemination was performed at Schnedler and Lee’s home without medical 
assistance.
26
 Lee gave birth to the child, J.A.L., in July 2007.
27
 After the 
child was born, Schnedler established a guardianship over J.A.L. in order to 
put the child on her insurance.
28
 Schnedler and Lee lived together at the 
time of the birth, and continued to live together with the child until April 
2015 when Lee left the residence.
29
 In November 2015, Lee stopped 
allowing Schnedler to visit with J.A.L.
30
 After the suit was filed, Lee 
asserted that Platt was a necessary party to the case because he was the 
biological father, and Platt joined the case to be adjudicated the father.
31
 
B. The Individual Pictures: Spot the Differences 
1. Schnedler’s Story 
Schnedler testified that she and Lee maintained a relationship from the 
time they met in 2002 until Lee left their home in August 2015.
32
 
According to Schnedler, Platt signed a written agreement that he would not 
assert any parental rights over the child; however, such a document was not 
                                                                                                                 
 23. See, e.g., Fleming v. Hyde, 2016 OK 23, ¶¶ 2-5, 368 P.3d 435, 435; Newland v. 
Taylor, 2016 OK 24, ¶¶ 2-5, 368 P.3d 435, 436. 
 24. Schnedler v. Lee, No. 115,362, slip op. at 2 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 18, 2017), cert. 
granted (Okla. Dec. 18, 2017).  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 5.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Id.  
 31. Id. at 3.  
 32. Id. at 4.  
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 To Schnedler’s knowledge, Platt never had contact 
with J.A.L., nor did he provide any financial support.
34
 Schnedler avers that 
she and Lee followed a visitation agreement until Lee terminated the 
agreement in November 2015.
35
 Essentially, Schnedler’s picture of the 
situation depicted a fairly typical scenario: two people, raising a child 
together—until one decided to leave and take the child with them, 
ultimately refusing to allow the other parent visitation rights. 
2. Lee and Platt’s Story 
Lee acknowledged that she and Schnedler were in a relationship, and that 
they planned to have the child together.
36
 Lee claimed, however, that the 
relationship ended after J.A.L.’s birth and that she and Schnedler lived 
together as roommates, not as partners.
37
 Lee further averred that before the 
birth of the child, she made it known that she intended to be the sole 
parent.
38
 As for Platt’s relationship with J.A.L., Lee and Platt corroborated 
each other’s stories. According to them, Platt visited the child frequently, 
provided some financial support, and even introduced the child to his 
family.
39
 Platt testified that he always intended to be the parent and have a 
father-daughter relationship with J.A.L.
40
 He further suggested that he was 
only casually acquainted with Schnedler, and claimed he had never signed 
any document that would terminate his parental rights.
41
 In short, Lee and 
Platt painted a very different picture: two people, raising a child together—
and the mother had a roommate who now seems to think that she has 
parental rights.  
C. The Decision 
Lee and Platt’s story managed to sway the court. It concluded that Platt 
did not agree to give up his parental rights with regards to J.A.L. and that he 
had a relationship with the child and provided financial support.
42
 Based on 
this finding, Schnedler had no standing to establish in loco parentis status 
                                                                                                                 
 33. Id. at 5.  
 34. Id.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 4-5. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 5.  
 39. Id. at 6. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 7. 
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because she failed to meet the third prong of the parentage test laid out by 
Ramey.
43
 This conclusion hinged on the question of whether or not Platt’s 
acquiescence to Schnedler’s relationship with the child was truly necessary 
under the meaning of the test. 
In Ramey, the biological father did not want to be a part of the family, 
and therefore he had neither a relationship with the child nor did he provide 
support.
44
 Thus, the Ramey court did not distinguish between the mother or 
the father when it referenced the “biological parent” in its test, and made no 
requirement of consent from the father.
45
 Unlike the sperm donor in Ramey, 
Platt stayed in the picture.
46
 The court here reasoned that it should be 
implicit that in the opposite situation, one where a biological father is 




The court also gave great consideration to the limiting statement from 
Ramey: “This decision does not extend any additional rights to step-
parents, grandparents, or others.”
48
 If Platt had “additional rights” as a 
parent, then this would exclude him from the “others” category and bump 
him into the “biological parent” category.
49
 In order to determine whether 
Platt possessed these “additional rights,” the court explored adoption 
cases.
50
 The court found that Platt would have the right to acquiesce or 
decline in an adoption proceeding; therefore, Platt had “additional rights” in 
the meaning of the Ramey test and fit into the “biological parent” 
category.
51
 The court continued to discuss what it means to act in loco 
parentis, finding that “[t]he requisites to establish the status of in loco 
parentis are stated to include consent of the ‘legal parent.’”
52
 Thus, in order 
to obtain in loco parentis status and bring suit, Schnedler had to show that 
both biological parents acquiesced and encouraged her relationship with 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. at 8 (citing Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d 217, 218 (“(3) the 
biological parent acquiesced and encouraged the same sex partner’s parental role following 
the birth of the child”)).  
 44. See Ramey, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218. 
 45. Id.; see also Schnedler, slip op. at 11.  
 46. Schnedler, slip op. at 9-10.  
 47. Id. at 11-12. 
 48. Id. at 9. 
 49. Id. at 10.  
 50. Id. at 12-13. 
 51. Id. at 12 (finding the evidence sufficient to show Platt had an active role in the 
child’s life and thus that he had the right to acquiesce in an adoption). 
 52. Id. at 13-14. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/7









It is worth noting that the court’s opinion is meant to decide the issue of 
Schnedler’s standing, yet the discussion is devoted to determining Platt’s 
rights, rather than investigating what rights Schnedler may have. 
Ultimately, it appears Schnedler was denied standing because, (1) the court 
accepted the version of the story in which Platt was an active, biological 
father who chose to remain in the picture, and (2) Platt’s apparent right to 
acquiesce in an adoption proceeding translated to his right to acquiesce in a 
proceeding to establish in loco parentis status under Ramey. However, the 
analysis does not seem to follow the Ramey test at all.  
III. The Big Picture: How Does the New Piece Fit? 
A. Mismatched Pieces: Puzzling Out Ramey 
The technical application of Ramey is fairly straightforward. The opinion 
created a three-pronged test to establish in loco parentis status, and extends 
standing for a best-interests-of-the-child hearing to those non-biological 
same-sex partners who meet the criteria.
55
 But the spirit of the opinion was 
a little more complicated. The court concentrated heavily on the best-
interests-of-the-child standard, at one point stating “[t]his couple, and more 
importantly, their child, is entitled to the love, protection and support from 
the only parents the child has known.”
56
 The court also gave great deference 
to what is “fair” to the parties involved. The facts section of the opinion 
discussed Ramey’s relationship with the child at length,
57
 and returned to 
the theme during its analysis, stating “Ramey has been intimately involved 
in the conception, birth and parenting of their child, at the request and 
invitation of Sutton.”
58
 The court pointed out that “[t]he uncertainty facing 
Ramey, as reflected in this litigation, is the exact peril identified in 
Obergefell.”
59
 Such emphatic and conscientious dicta suggests that there is 
                                                                                                                 
 53. Id. at 15.  
 54. Id. at 6.  
 55. See Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d 217, 218. 
 56. Id. ¶ 17, 362 P.3d at 221.  
 57. Id. ¶ 8, 362 P.3d at 219. 
 58. Id. ¶ 16, 362 P.3d at 221.  
 59. Id. Obergefell featured couples whose marital statuses and rights were in question in 
states that had not yet legalized same-sex marriage. See generally Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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something going on in this case that is a bit more complex than a mere 
application of the in loco parentis doctrine.  
While the court in Ramey did manage to find a legal basis on which to 
apply its decision, the basis of the three-pronged test seems to be something 
more akin to equity. The first prong requiring the parties to be “unable to 
marry legally” was qualified with the caveat “prior to Bishop, or 
Obergefell.”
60
 The court briefly stated that the fact that Oklahoma law 
prevented the couple’s marriage should not be a bar to Ramey’s rights as a 
parent.
61
 This, it argued, is not law, this is simply what is fair. The second 
prong, “engaged in intentional family planning,” is also simply an 
application to the fact of the case.
62
 It merely suggests that if the parties 
planned to have a child together, each party ought to—and ought to have 
the opportunity to—see it through. It is not until the third prong of the test 
that a truly “legal” implication appears: “the biological parent acquiesced 
and encouraged the same sex partner’s parental role.”
63
 Here we see a nod 
to the in loco parentis doctrine, in requiring the acquiescence and 
encouragement of the biological parent. And it is this prong that the 
Schnedler court latched on to in making its analysis, to the exclusion of the 
spirit of the rest of the Ramey test, and indeed, to the rest of the opinion.  
B. Forcing a Fit: Applying Ramey to Schnedler  
Ultimately, the biggest issue is that Schnedler and Ramey are not the 
same case. Their facts, while similar in some respects, are clearly—and 
admittedly—distinguishable in others.
64
 The court stated: “[v]iewed strictly, 
Ramey does not address the issue presented by the fact of the case here 
under review,”
65
 and that “[a] strict interpretation method would have this 
Court limit Ramey to its specific facts and specific result[s].”
66
 The court 
further explained that the other option was to interpret Ramey:  
to include not only relief for a civil union partner but also relief 
for a biological father by requiring evidence to show whether the 
biological father acquiesced and encouraged the civil union 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Ramey, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218. 
 61. Id. ¶ 13, 362 P.3d at 220-21.  
 62. Id. ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Schnedler v. Lee, No. 115,362, slip op. at 9 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 18, 2017). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 10. 
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partner’s parental role and thereby exclude the biological father 
from the “or others” limitation stated by the Ramey court.
67
  
Despite its recognition that the facts of the cases do not fit together, the 
court chose the latter option, determined to find a way to make Platt fit into 
the picture Ramey created.  
The court recognized there was no biological father in Ramey,
68
 but it 
failed to acknowledge that the very fact that the biological father was not at 
issue in Ramey could suggest that the court did not contemplate a biological 
father’s rights when it created its test. In fact, footnote four of the Ramey 
decision specifically points out that the donor was not a party to the 
action.
69
 When the Ramey court said “biological parent” in the third prong 
of the test, it was likely referring to only the biological mother. Thus, the 
court’s interpretation of whether Platt fell into the “biological parent” status 
was misguided and not in keeping with what the Ramey court intended in 
the application of its test. 
In the absence of a biological father, the Ramey court did not require his 
consent.
70
 The Schnedler court, however, inverted this logic and stated that 
it is “implicit” that if the absence of a biological father rendered his consent 
unnecessary, the presence of a biological father must render his consent 
necessary.
71
 The court’s position is a deductive fallacy not based on any 
affirmative statement made by the Ramey court. It represents pure 
conjecture based on the court’s inference from an issue that was not decided 
in Ramey. But this deduction was not quite enough for a conclusion; the 
court needed to actually apply the test. 
The Schnedler court relied on the adoption standard to reach its decision 
as to whether Platt qualified as a “biological parent” for the third prong of 
the test.
72
 The court chose this standard by picking apart the limitation 
statement from Ramey,
73
 which limited its decision to the facts of the case, 
and declined the extension of “additional rights” to “step-parents, 
grandparents, or others” under its test.
74
 From this statement, the Schnedler 
court inferred, again, that any parent who has any additional rights to a 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, ¶ 6 n.4, 362 P.3d 217, 219 n.4. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Schnedler, slip op. at 11-12.  
 72. Id. at 12-13. 
 73. Id. at 13. 
 74. Id. at 12-13 (quoting Ramey, ¶ 19, 362 P.3d at 221).  
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child cannot be considered one of the “others” in the meaning of the 
limitation, and must therefore be a “biological parent.”
75
 By establishing 
that Platt’s consent is required in an adoption, the court reasoned that this 
gives him “additional rights” as referenced in the limiting statement of the 
Ramey decision,
76
 and therefore renders him a “biological parent” rather 
than an “other.” This meant that his consent was required under the Ramey 
test in order to allow Schnedler status of in loco parentis.
77
  
The court’s reasoning here was tenuous at best, and the court misplaced 
its reliance when it analyzed the adoption standard for this purpose. Ramey 
pointed out that the doctrine of in loco parentis is “one who has assumed 
the status and obligations of a parent without formal adoption.”
78
 The 
Schnedler court itself quoted this statement in its analysis.
79
 It also asserted 
that “for the purposes of determining whether the consent of the biological 
father is required, there is no legal distinction between in loco parentis and 
adoption.”
80
 But this was nothing other than more conjecture based, 
apparently, on the fact that adoption and in loco parentis status both require 
the consent of a biological parent. So why did the court rely so heavily on 
Platt’s rights in an adoption, when it purported to be determining 
Schnedler’s status under the Ramey test?  
The court’s discussion of whether Platt has rights under the adoption 
standard is an analysis of what status he fits into for the purposes of the 
Ramey test’s third prong. However, this defeats the intended use of the test. 
First, the Ramey test does not contemplate the status of the biological father 
at all.
81
 Second, the Ramey court’s limitation statement that “[t]his decision 
does not extend any additional rights to step-parents, grandparents, or 
others” does not necessarily mean that any biological parent who would 
have additional rights under another legal standard is automatically not an 
“other” in the context of the Ramey decision.
82
 Thus, the court’s analysis of 
whether Platt has rights under the adoption standard was irrelevant. Platt’s 
status was not contemplated by the Ramey court, and his right to consent in 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Id. at 13.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 8.  
 78. Ramey, ¶ 2 n.2, 362 P.3d at 218 n.2 (quoting Workman v. Workman, 1972 OK 74, ¶ 
10, 498 P.2d 1384, 1386 (emphasis added)). 
 79. Schnedler, slip op. at 13. 
 80.  Id. at 15.  
 81. See generally Ramey, 2015 OK 79, 362 P.3d 217. 
 82. Id. ¶ 19, 362 P.3d at 221. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss2/7
2019]       NOTES 563 
 
 
an adoption is immaterial as to whether his consent is required to allow 
Schnedler in loco parentis status under the Ramey test.  
C. Flaws in Ramey, Exacerbated by Schnedler 
Based on the misapplication of the Ramey test in Schnedler, it seems safe 
to say that the test’s purpose is best served when the test is applied to fact 
patterns nearly identical to Ramey. Even then, however, the test represents 
more of a short-term reprieve from same-sex couple custody issues than a 
long-term solution.
83
 Each prong of the test has its own problems and 
limitations that prevent it from being an easy-to-apply bright line rule.  
The first prong, which requires that the couple be unable to marry when 
the child was conceived, is limited both temporally and as a matter of 
policy. Temporally, the prong will become irrelevant with the passage of 
time. Retroactivity issues aside, as years pass, the time in which same-sex 
couples were unable to marry will slip further and further into the past. 
Although the issue of same-sex marriage was still germane to the issue in 




In addition, despite the Ramey court’s attempt to keep to the spirit of 
Obergefell, it incidentally created inequality. A consideration as to whether 
a couple could or did marry is not a requirement to determine parentage in 
an opposite-sex couple.
85
 However, the Ramey court made a consideration 
of marriage one of the considerations for same-sex couples.
86
 To even 
consider the marital status (or the possibility thereof) of a same-sex couple 
when the same is not required for opposite-sex couples is unequal treatment 
based on sexual orientation in violation of Obergefell.
87
 Further, the Ramey 
court adopted this requirement when it was unnecessary, and likely did so 
simply as a response to Sutton’s argument that Ramey was not entitled to 
                                                                                                                 
 83. See generally Spector, supra note 4.  
 84. Id. at 9.  
 85. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-201 (2011).  
 86. Ramey, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218. 
 87. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015). (extending equal treatment 
to same-sex couples, the Court emphasized that “[same-sex couples] ask for equal dignity in 
the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”); see also Pavan v. Smith, 137 
S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (holding that Arkansas’ requirements that a male father be 
named on the birth certificate were marriage-based and therefore in violation of Obergefell 
when these requirements denied a mother’s same-sex partner the right to be named on the 
birth certificate of their child).  
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parental status because the two never married.
88
 The Uniform Parentage Act 
provides that children born outside of wedlock will be treated the same as 
children who were born to parents who are married.
89
 The court could have 
applied this standard to children of same-sex couples, obviating the need for 
any consideration of marital status.  
The second prong of the test is likely the least problematic of the three. It 
requires the couple to have “engaged in intentional family planning.”
90
 For 
same-sex couples, this is necessary in order to have a child in the first place 
because “[for] same-sex couples, children do not come about by 
accident.”
91
 Thus, this prong seems to be the most helpful for determining 
parentage, because it focuses on the intent of the parties. Admittedly, there 
can be debate as to what the parties intended (as in Schnedler). Courts may 
be required to engage in some fact-finding to determine the parties’ true 
intentions when they decided to have a child. However, for the most part, 
this prong would be relatively easy to rely on based upon the fact that the 
intent to have a child is usually required in the context of same-sex couples.  
Finally, the in loco parentis doctrine espoused by Ramey’s third prong 
may be an improper standard to apply. In loco parentis status applies to any 
person who acts in the place of a parent, whether that person be a step-
parent, grandparent, or any other “third person.”
92
 While courts in same-sex 
couple custody disputes point out that they do not intend for their opinions 
to extend to grandparents, step-parents, etc.,
93
 this represents a slippery 
slope which should not be tested. The parties in these cases are not 
generally some third party who has simply acted like a parent. They are 
individuals whose relationship with the biological parent and desire for a 
family led to the child’s very existence, despite the fact that they share no 
biological connection to the child. The doctrine of in loco parentis fails to 
truly capture the essence of this particular relationship. 
Schnedler solved none of these issues. Rather than attempting to find a 
solution that was tailored to fit the fact pattern, the Schnedler court 
attempted to force the facts to fit the existing test.
94
 In essence, it affirmed 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Ramey, ¶ 4, 362 P.3d at 219. 
 89. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-202 (2011).  
 90. Ramey, ¶ 2, 362 P.3d at 218.  
 91. Spector, supra note 4, at 15. 
 92. Francis C. Amendola et. al., 67A C.J.S. Parent and Child § 366 (2018).  
 93. See Ramey, ¶ 19, 362 P.3d at 221; Eldredge v. Taylor, 2014 OK 92, ¶ 21, 339 P.3d 
888, 895.  
 94. See Schnedler v. Lee, No. 115,362, slip op. at 8-10 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 18, 2017).  
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the use of the test and suggested a “make it work” attitude toward it. This 
seems like a step backward. Not only was the application of the test 
improper, it also denied a mother the right to seek visitation of the child 
who she had loved and raised for eight years. This is not what was intended 
when same-sex couples were finally granted equal treatment. It is likely 
that, over time, new and more complex permutations of the family image 
will be presented, and the Ramey test will simply not be able to account for 
all of them. The Schnedler court should have looked elsewhere for the 
solution to the issues before it.  
IV. Completing the New Picture; Suggested Solutions  
A. Change the Uniform Parentage Act 
The Uniform Parentage Act “applies to [the] determination of parentage” 
in Oklahoma, and focuses on establishing the existence of a parent-child 
relationship.
95
 A woman is generally determined to be the mother of a child 
by either giving birth to or adopting the child.
96
 The determination of the 
father, however, has a few more possible tests.
97
 In any case, the definitions 
included in the UPA suggest that it applies solely to opposite-sex couples.
98
 
In 2017, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws released a new draft of the UPA that is gender neutral.
99
 But this new 
UPA has not yet been enacted in Oklahoma. Nevertheless, the courts could 
begin to at least attempt to apply a gender-neutral reading of the state’s 
existing UPA. The decisions under these readings might lead to an 
understanding of what issues need to be addressed in this relatively new 
arena. In fact, some other state courts have begun to test this solution.
100
  
In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court struck down 
a decision that ruled a woman could not be adjudicated the mother of her 
twins because she was not a parent within the meaning of California’s 
                                                                                                                 
 95. 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 7700-103, -201 (2011). 
 96. Id. § 7700-201.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. § 7700-102. 
 99. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L., Proposed 
Official Draft 2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/UPA2017_Final_ 
2017sep22.pdf (using “individual” rather than “man,” even if the mother being female is 
essentially required, to determine who can be the presumed other parent). 
 100. See Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 665-70 (Cal. 2005); In re Parental 
Responsibilities of A.R.L., 318 P.3d 581, 588 (Colo. App. 2013).  
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 The parties to the case were two women who had been in a 
romantic relationship and chose to be artificially inseminated in order to 
raise a family together.
102
 Later the two split up, and the biological mother, 
Emily, sought child support from the non-biological mother, Elisa.
103
 
According to California’s UPA, a man could be adjudicated to be a parent 
by showing that he had taken the child into his home and held it out as his 
own.
104
 After analyzing several other cases where a female had been 
adjudicated the mother of a child based on this same standard,
105
 the court 
found that Elisa was the mother of the children, since the evidence showed 
that she had taken “the children into her home” and held them out openly as 
her own.
106
 Thus, a child may have two parents who are both women, by 
way of the court analyzing a woman’s conduct the same way that they 
would analyze a man’s. Here, a gender-neutral reading of the state’s UPA 
solved the same-sex couples’ custody dispute.  
The Schnedler court could have used a similar method. Rather than 
forcing the case into the Ramey test, the court could have discussed 
Oklahoma’s UPA and considered its meaning to be gender neutral. The 
Oklahoma UPA states that a man can be considered the presumed father of 
a child if “[f]or the first two (2) years of the child's life, he resided in the 
same household with the child and openly held out the child as his own,” 
which is similar to the wording of the California Act discussed in Elisa 
B..
107
 If the court applied this standard in a gender-neutral manner, it would 
likely find that Schnedler was indeed the other presumed parent of J.A.L. 
Schnedler lived with J.A.L. from the time she was born and arguably held 
the child out as her own.
108
 But for Platt coming back into the picture and 
asserting his paternity, Schnedler would be the only other party available 
for this parentage position.
109
 Of course, Platt’s voluntary 
                                                                                                                 
 101. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 671-72.  
 102. Id. at 663.  
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 664 (citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d)(Deering 2018)). 
 105. Id. at 666-69. 
 106. Id. at 670. 
 107. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-204 (2011). 
 108. Id.; see also Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 668 (citing a case that states that “‘the most 
compelling evidence’ that she held out the child as her own was that the eight-year-old child 
‘believed appellant was his mother’”(quoting In re Salvador M., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 705, 708 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2003)). 
 109. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 7700-204 (2011); see also Spector, supra note 4, at 11 (“The 
parentage provisions . . . are primarily geared to presuming fatherhood couples with 
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acknowledgement of his parentage complicated matters.
110
 But, the fact that 
Schnedler could meet a presumption of parentage with a gender-neutral 
reading of the UPA could at the very least allow her standing for a best-
interests-of-the-child hearing.  
B. Recognize that There Can Be More than Two Parents  
In all same-sex couple custody actions, there will invariably be, at the 
very least, three people who could be considered a parent—the two 
biological parents and the same-sex partner. In many cases, the “donor 
parent” will have given up all rights to parentage, which makes things 
easier for the courts.
111
 However, the facts in Schnedler make it clear that 
tri-parent families are an issue that must be considered in Oklahoma. Rather 
than attempting to force these parties into the “traditional” image of a 
family by means of already existing parentage standards, the courts—and 
eventually the legislature—should devise a more novel way of examining 
the pieces of these somewhat more intricate parent-child relationships.  
The 2017 draft of the Uniform Parentage Act allows state legislatures to 
choose to recognize more than two parents.
112
 A handful of states have 
already worked tri-parent families into their Parentage Acts.
113
 The 
California code states: “[i]n an appropriate action, a court may find that 
more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are 
parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be 
detrimental to the child.”
114
 The standard is essentially based on the best 
                                                                                                                 
parentage proceedings the primary method of determining parentage in non-married 
couples.”).  
 110. Schnedler, slip op. at 6. 
 111. See Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, ¶ 6 n.4, 362 P.3d 217, 219 n.4. 
 112. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 613 (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. ST. L., Proposed 
Official Draft 2017), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/parentage/ UPA2017_Final_ 
2017sep22.pdf (giving a choice to ratify the act with either “Alternative A,” which limits 
parents to two” or “Alternative B,” which allows courts to recognize more than two parents).  
 113. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612 (Deering 2018) (expressing that the court may find two 
or more parents); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (2013) (indicating a de facto parent 
may be adjudicated a parent if the “parent or parents” fostered the relationship with the 
child, inferentially allowing more than two parents); D.C. CODE § 16-909 (2013) (having 
multiple presumptions of parentage with no limit on the number of parents, thereby 
inferentially allowing for the possibility of more than two people being presumed parents); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853(2) (2017) (conveying the concept that a court may 
find more than two parents). 
 114. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (Deering 2018). 
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interest of the child, just like most custody hearings.
115
 If the court in 
Schnedler took a similar view, the issue of whether Schnedler could bring 
suit would be simple to decide. The evidence was such that the court could 
have found that each of the parties—Schnedler, Lee, and Platt—played a 
significant role in the child’s life.
116
 Of course, granting Schnedler standing 
would require the court to conduct a full-scale custody and visitation 
hearing to reconcile the conflicting stories of the parties and assign the 
parties’ rights, but this would not have been impossible.
117
  
In Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, the Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed 
the issue of a tri-parent family.
118
 In Jacob, the court reconciled a custody 
and support issue for a lesbian couple and their sperm donor.
119
 The donor 
was active in the lives of the children and all parties recognized each 
other’s place in the children’s lives.
120
 In ruling on child support, the trial 
court “view[ed] the interjection of a third person in the traditional support 
scenario [as creating] an untenable situation, never having been anticipated 
by Pennsylvania law.”
121
 But the Superior Court disagreed, stating that it 
was “not convinced that the calculus of support arrangements cannot be 
reformulated.”
122
 The court, recognizing the need for a new approach, 
noted: 
We recognize this is a matter which is better addressed by the 
legislature rather than the courts. However, in the absence of 
legislative mandates, the courts must construct a fair, workable 
and responsible basis for the protection of children, aside from 
whatever rights the adults may have vis a vis each other.
123
 
The Schnedler court should take note. 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id.  
 116. See Schnedler, slip op. at 4-6. 
 117. See Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).  
 118. Id. at 476. 
 119. Id.  
 120. Id. at 477 (noting that the parties stipulated to non-biological mother’s in loco 
parentis status, while the other two are the acknowledged biological parents). 
 121. Id. at 482. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (quoting L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872, 878 (Pa. Super. 2002)). 
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The basis of the Schnedler opinion seems to have nothing to do with the 
best interests of J.A.L.
124
 Compared to Ramey, which held a fairly 
impassioned stance on the mother-child relationship in question,
125
 the 
Schnedler opinion reads like a cold calculation of Platt’s rights vis-à-vis 
Schnedler’s rights.
126
 Not once in its opinion does the court seem to wonder 
what is best for the child whom Schnedler lived with and acted as mother to 
for eight years. Rather, it rigidly applied an arguably inappropriate test and 
ultimately denied Schnedler her day in court.
127
 If the court took a more 
liberal approach, like the court in Jacob, it might have recognized that 
perhaps both Schnedler and Platt qualified as J.A.L.’s parents. Granted, this 
means that the court would have to devise a new method of assigning 
responsibilities for these parties. But, as the Jacob court points out, the 
court must sometimes “construct a fair, workable and responsible basis for 
the protection of children, aside from whatever rights the adults may have 
vis a vis each other.”
128
 It seems unlikely that a solution could not somehow 
be found—if only the court were willing to reimagine the family unit.  
C. Focus on the Intent of the Parties 
Essentially, intent to become parents is required in order for a same-sex 
couple to have a child, as some sort of purposeful insemination must 
occur.
129
 Thus, looking to the intentions of the parties in relation to their 
parentage status would be a rational, and in many cases simpler, option for 
determining parentage. Some courts have already begun to do so. 
In K.M. v. E.G., the parties were a lesbian couple whose relationship 
ended after the birth of their twins.
130
 K.M. donated her own ova to E.G. in 
order for E.G. to be able to carry the child, and they chose a sperm donor 
together.
131
 During the donation process, K.M. signed a donor’s consent 
form, which stated that she would relinquish any parental rights to the child 
                                                                                                                 
 124. See Schnedler v. Lee, No. 115,362, slip op. at 7 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 18, 2017) 
(reviewing the trial court findings, all of which pertain to Platt’s position as the biological 
parent).  
 125. Ramey v. Sutton, 2015 OK 79, ¶ 17, 362 P.3d 217, 221. (“This couple and more 
importantly, their child, is entitled to the love, protection and support from the only parents 
the child has known.”).  
 126. See generally Schnedler, No. 115,362, slip op. (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 18, 2017).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).  
 129. Spector, supra note 4, at 15-16.  
 130. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 677 (Cal. 2005). 
 131. Id. at 676. 
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 However, K.M. asserted that she saw this form only moments 
before the procedure and did not believe that every clause applied to her, as 
it was her understanding that she and E.G. were planning to raise the child 
together.
133
 E.G., on the other hand, insisted that she had always planned to 
be a single parent, and that she would not have accepted K.M.’s ova if she 
did not sign the consent form.
134
 The California Supreme Court chose to 
take a closer look to determine the true intentions of the parties.
135
  
The court examined an earlier case, Johnson v. Calvert,
136
 which held 
that the traditional presumptions of parentage under the UPC did not apply 
because “the husband and wife in Johnson did not intend to ‘donate’ their 
sperm and ova to the surrogate mother, but rather ‘intended to procreate a 
child genetically related to them by the only available means.’”
137
 The court 
then extended this reasoning to K.M. v. E.G., and found that “K.M. did not 
intend to simply donate her ova to E.G., but rather provided her ova to her 
lesbian partner with whom she was living so that E.G. could give birth to a 
child that would be raised in their joint home.”
138
 Ultimately, the court 
ruled that both K.M. and E.G. qualified as mothers under a gender-neutral 
reading of California’s Uniform Parentage Act, rather than relying on the 
intent test.
139
 Nevertheless, the court’s analysis shows that the intent test 
can be used in matters regarding same-sex couple custody disputes. Further, 
the result of the intent test in this case was effectively the same as the 
conclusion the court reached through other means—both women were the 
mother of the children in question. However, the intent test should be 
approached with caution.  
 Relying on the intent test would mean that the determination of 
parentage would rest upon a “later judicial determination of intent made 
                                                                                                                 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 678.  
 136. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). A heterosexual husband and wife 
contributed their own genetic materials, implanted in a surrogate mother. Id. at 778. The 
court was required to determine whether the surrogate, who gave birth, or the wife, who 
provided the ovum, was the natural mother of the child. Id. The court ultimately held that the 
wife was the mother, based on the intentions of the parties. Id. at 787. 
 137. K.M., 117 P.3d at 678-79 (quoting Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)). 
 138. Id. at 679.  
 139. Id. at 682.  
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years after the birth of the child.”
140
 While there has been a wealth of 
research regarding the intent test, scholars and courts have yet to reach a 
consensus as to how, when, and in what context the test should be 
applied.
141
 One major consideration is timing.
142
 Most scholars and many 
statutes that speak to artificial insemination have determined that the 
moment of conception is the proper interval at which to analyze intent.
143
 
However, intent has been analyzed at different times.
144
 Post-birth intent 
“may implicitly lie behind definitions of social paternity that require the 
father to ‘hold out’ the child as his own,” essentially using this “holding 
out” as evidence of intent.
145
 This means that the analysis of post-birth 
intention can easily translate into already-accepted determinations of 
parentage, which may be more palatable to many judges.  
The intent test alone would not be appropriate for every determination of 
parentage.
146
 Children are still conceived unintentionally in heterosexual 
relationships, and the law must continue to consider those relationships. 
Absent a complete change in the legal structure of parentage, custody, and 
child support, the law cannot base parentage purely on intent.
147
 The courts 
in both K.M. v. E.G. and Johnson v. Calvert used a combination of the 
intent test and other UPA-based analyses to determine which parties should 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See id. But even with heterosexual couples, cases involving artificial insemination 
will require a judicial determination of parentage after the child has been born. See, e.g., 
People v. Sorenson, 437 P.2d 495, 497 (Cal. 1968) (involving a situation where a 
heterosexual couple used another man’s sperm to inseminate the wife, the parties divorced, 
and the court determined that the husband was the father and required to pay child support 
because he signed an agreement for the insemination, assuming the responsibility of a 
parent). 
 141. See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 210, 227-28 (2012); see also Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: 
Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227 
(2006); Heather Kolinsky, The Intended Parent: The Power and Problems Inherent in 
Designating and Determining Intent in the Context of Parental Rights, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 
801 (2015). 
 142. Purvis, supra not 141, at 229. 
 143. Id. at 229-30.  
 144. Id. at 230; see also K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005) (considering post-birth 
intent); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (same).  
 145. Purvis, supra note 141, at 230.  
 146. See generally Purvis, supra note 141.  
 147. Id. at 229.  
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be deemed the parents of the respective children.
148
 After all, the 
determination of parentage and the legitimacy of children is meant to 
protect the best interest of the child in question.
149
 So why not use multiple 
avenues to ensure optimal protection?  
If the Schnedler court was willing to consider the intent test, Schnedler 
would likely have had her day in court. Although the parties’ assertions as 
to their intentions conflict, there is at least some evidence that Lee and 
Schnedler both intended at some point to be the co-parents of J.A.L.
150
 If 
the court had recognized that intent could confer parental status, Schnedler 
would have standing under the facts. The court could then analyze various 
parentage regimes, and possibly combinations thereof, to determine what 
was in the child’s best interest.  
V. Scattered Pieces: A Picture in Progress 
In the case of Schnedler v. Lee, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals 
missed the mark entirely. The right to parent one’s child is a fundamental 
right.
151
 And since Obergefell officially validated same-sex marriage, courts 
have leaned toward facilitating the familial rights of same-sex couples, 
setting aside defunct precedent and creating new tests and standards to meet 
the novel issues that these cases present.
152
 The Schnedler court failed to 
join the trend. Instead the court looked backwards, searching for a bright 
line rule that would enable it to make a ruling without requiring it to admit 
that there was no appropriate law to address the facts before it. And as a 
result, the court denied Lori Schnedler not only standing, but also her 
relationship with her daughter.  
In its search for a bright-line rule, the court settled upon the Ramey test, 
but its reliance on Ramey was misguided and misapplied. The Ramey test 
itself was designed to facilitate the novel set of facts that the court 
confronted. Thus, the test is limited to cases with nearly identical facts—a 
                                                                                                                 
 148. See generally, K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 
776 (Cal. 1993). 
 149. See generally Appleton, supra note 141.  
 150. Schnedler v. Lee, No. 115,362, slip op. at 4-6 (Okla. Civ. App. Aug. 18, 2017). 
 151. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 76 (2000).  
 152. See generally Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1296 
(N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d on other grounds, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[T]his court 
knows a rhetorical shift when it sees one.”); Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473, 482 (Pa. 
2007) (“[I]n the absence of legislative mandates, the courts must construct a fair, workable 
and responsible basis for the protection of children.”). 
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qualification that Schnedler lacked. Further, the Ramey test is flawed, and 
simply cannot be used as a long-term solution for same-sex child-custody 
disputes. This is especially true considering it is likely that the court will 
continue to be faced with new and different scenarios that will arise from 
these relationships. Though there is bound to be some error, new tests must 
be tried.  
There is not yet a consensus as to how to confront the same-sex child 
custody issue. Some states and courts have enacted a gender-neutral reading 
of their Uniform Parentage Act, and this approach has garnered some 
success. Other courts have chosen to recognize that new family units may 
feature more than the traditional two-parent set. And still other courts have 
acknowledged that the intentions of the parties play a huge role in who 
should be deemed a parent. No single test is flawless, nor will any be a 
perfect fit for each case that comes before the bench. Ultimately, the 
legislature must work with the courts to find a solution that will make these 
problems easier to predict and resolve. 
In December 2017, the Oklahoma Supreme Court unanimously granted 
certiorari to review Schnedler.
153
 While it is not possible to know exactly 
how the Court will rule, its decision to hear the case may be some 
indication that the Court recognizes some of the flaws in the lower court’s 




                                                                                                                 
 153. Order Granting Writ of Certiorari, Schnedler v. Lee, No. 115,362 (Okla. Dec. 18, 
2017). 
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